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All the ideas for '', 'Academica' and 'Epistemic Norms'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
2661 Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
2673 There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero]
8820 Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
8819 We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
11211 If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
2669 Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11210 Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
11212 The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
8822 Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
8818 Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
2664 If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
2665 How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
8811 What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
8817 Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8814 Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8823 Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8813 If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
8812 Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock]
8816 Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
8815 Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
20800 Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
11214 We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
2672 Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero]