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All the ideas for '', 'Thinking About Mechanisms' and 'Absolute Necessities'

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25 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
11211 If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11210 Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
11212 The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
16554 Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
16556 Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
15086 Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
8261 Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
15081 A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
15080 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15082 Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
15085 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale]
15088 Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
15087 Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
16562 We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16563 The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
16555 Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
16528 Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16529 Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16530 A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16553 Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16559 Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
16564 There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
16561 We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
11214 We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
16558 Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]