19 ideas
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
7306 | If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A] |
10429 | It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury] |
10425 | Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury] |
10438 | Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury] |
7322 | Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A] |
7325 | Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A] |
7324 | Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A] |
10432 | A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury] |
10434 | Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury] |
7323 | If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A] |
7315 | 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
7328 | The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A] |
7329 | Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A] |
7333 | The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A] |
10431 | Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury] |