17 ideas
6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |