36 ideas
21844 | The history of philosophy is an agent of power: how can you think if you haven't read the great names? [Deleuze] |
21849 | Thought should be thrown like a stone from a war-machine [Deleuze] |
21845 | Philosophy aims to become the official language, supporting orthodoxy and the state [Deleuze] |
21839 | When I meet objections I just move on; they never contribute anything [Deleuze] |
21841 | We must create new words, and treat them as normal, and as if designating real things. [Deleuze] |
21842 | Don't assess ideas for truth or justice; look for another idea, and establish a relationship with it [Deleuze] |
21850 | Dualisms can be undone from within, by tracing connections, and drawing them to a new path [Deleuze] |
16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
21838 | Before we seek solutions, it is important to invent problems [Deleuze] |
21847 | Before Being there is politics [Deleuze] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
21840 | A meeting of man and animal can be deterritorialization (like a wasp with an orchid) [Deleuze] |
21843 | People consist of many undetermined lines, some rigid, some supple, some 'lines of flight' [Deleuze] |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
16956 | To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett] |
21848 | Some lines (of flight) are becomings which escape the system [Deleuze] |
16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |