34 ideas
2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
9967 | 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
9968 | A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien] |
9965 | There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien] |
9966 | The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien] |
9964 | Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien] |
9962 | How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien] |
9963 | If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien] |
2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
9969 | The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien] |
2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |