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All the ideas for '', 'The Moral Problem' and 'The Idea of Justice'

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47 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
What justifies reliance on reason? Is it just a tool? Why is it better than blind belief? [Sen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
In politics and ethics, scrutiny from different perspectives is essential for objectivity [Sen]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
Rationality is conformity to reasons that can be sustained even after scrutiny [Sen]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 9. Contractualism
A human right is not plausible if public scrutiny might reject it [Sen]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
The original position insures that the agreements reached are fair [Sen]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The veil of ignorance encourages neutral interests, but not a wider view of values [Sen]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
A social contract limits the pursuit of justice to members of a single society [Sen]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A person's voice may count because of their interests, or because of their good sense [Sen]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
Famines tend to be caused by authoritarian rule [Sen]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Effective democracy needs tolerant values [Sen]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Democracy as 'government by discussion' now has wide support [Sen]
Democracy needs more than some institutions; diverse sections of the people must be heard [Sen]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 13. Green Politics
Eradicating smallpox does not impoverish nature [Sen]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Capabilities are part of freedom, involving real opportunities [Sen]
Freedom can involve capabilities, independence and non-interference [Sen]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
The need for equality among people arises from impartiality and objectivity [Sen]
All modern theories of justice demand equality of something [Sen]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Freedom from torture or terrorist attacks is independent of citizenship [Sen]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
You don't need a complete theory of justice to see that slavery is wrong [Sen]
Practical justice concerns not only ideals, but ways to achieve them [Sen]
Our institutions should promote justice, rather than embodying it [Sen]
We must focus on removing manifest injustice, not just try to design a perfect society [Sen]
If justice needs public reasoning, which needs democracy, then justice and democracy are linked [Sen]