45 ideas
3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
10146 | Cantor's theories needed the Axiom of Choice, but it has led to great controversy [Feferman/Feferman] |
10147 | The Axiom of Choice is consistent with the other axioms of set theory [Feferman/Feferman] |
10148 | Axiom of Choice: a set exists which chooses just one element each of any set of sets [Feferman/Feferman] |
10149 | Platonist will accept the Axiom of Choice, but others want criteria of selection or definition [Feferman/Feferman] |
10150 | The Trichotomy Principle is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice [Feferman/Feferman] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
10158 | A structure is a 'model' when the axioms are true. So which of the structures are models? [Feferman/Feferman] |
10162 | Tarski and Vaught established the equivalence relations between first-order structures [Feferman/Feferman] |
10159 | Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, and Gödel's completeness of first-order logic, the earliest model theory [Feferman/Feferman] |
10160 | Löwenheim-Skolem says if the sentences are countable, so is the model [Feferman/Feferman] |
10161 | If a sentence holds in every model of a theory, then it is logically derivable from the theory [Feferman/Feferman] |
10156 | 'Recursion theory' concerns what can be solved by computing machines [Feferman/Feferman] |
10155 | Both Principia Mathematica and Peano Arithmetic are undecidable [Feferman/Feferman] |
3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |