31 ideas
21844 | The history of philosophy is an agent of power: how can you think if you haven't read the great names? [Deleuze] |
21849 | Thought should be thrown like a stone from a war-machine [Deleuze] |
21845 | Philosophy aims to become the official language, supporting orthodoxy and the state [Deleuze] |
21839 | When I meet objections I just move on; they never contribute anything [Deleuze] |
21841 | We must create new words, and treat them as normal, and as if designating real things. [Deleuze] |
21842 | Don't assess ideas for truth or justice; look for another idea, and establish a relationship with it [Deleuze] |
21850 | Dualisms can be undone from within, by tracing connections, and drawing them to a new path [Deleuze] |
21752 | Prior to Gödel we thought truth in mathematics consisted in provability [Gödel, by Quine] |
17835 | Gödel show that the incompleteness of set theory was a necessity [Gödel, by Hallett,M] |
17886 | The limitations of axiomatisation were revealed by the incompleteness theorems [Gödel, by Koellner] |
10071 | Second Incompleteness: nice theories can't prove their own consistency [Gödel, by Smith,P] |
19123 | If soundness can't be proved internally, 'reflection principles' can be added to assert soundness [Gödel, by Halbach/Leigh] |
10621 | Gödel's First Theorem sabotages logicism, and the Second sabotages Hilbert's Programme [Smith,P on Gödel] |
17888 | The undecidable sentence can be decided at a 'higher' level in the system [Gödel] |
21838 | Before we seek solutions, it is important to invent problems [Deleuze] |
10132 | There can be no single consistent theory from which all mathematical truths can be derived [Gödel, by George/Velleman] |
3198 | Gödel showed that arithmetic is either incomplete or inconsistent [Gödel, by Rey] |
10072 | First Incompleteness: arithmetic must always be incomplete [Gödel, by Smith,P] |
9590 | Arithmetical truth cannot be fully and formally derived from axioms and inference rules [Gödel, by Nagel/Newman] |
11069 | Gödel's Second says that semantic consequence outruns provability [Gödel, by Hanna] |
10118 | First Incompleteness: a decent consistent system is syntactically incomplete [Gödel, by George/Velleman] |
10122 | Second Incompleteness: a decent consistent system can't prove its own consistency [Gödel, by George/Velleman] |
10611 | There is a sentence which a theory can show is true iff it is unprovable [Gödel, by Smith,P] |
10867 | 'This system can't prove this statement' makes it unprovable either way [Gödel, by Clegg] |
8747 | Realists are happy with impredicative definitions, which describe entities in terms of other existing entities [Gödel, by Shapiro] |
21847 | Before Being there is politics [Deleuze] |
17503 | Theories can never represent accurately, because their components are abstract [Cartwright,N, by Portides] |
21840 | A meeting of man and animal can be deterritorialization (like a wasp with an orchid) [Deleuze] |
21843 | People consist of many undetermined lines, some rigid, some supple, some 'lines of flight' [Deleuze] |
3192 | Basic logic can be done by syntax, with no semantics [Gödel, by Rey] |
21848 | Some lines (of flight) are becomings which escape the system [Deleuze] |