Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'What Does It Take to Refer?st1=Kent Bach', 'Ways Worlds Could Be' and 'Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD)'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

26 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
10455 Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
10454 In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
10453 In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10452 Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
10456 Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
10440 An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
10444 Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
13412 Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf]
13413 We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
13411 If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
13415 An adequate account of a number must relate it to its series [Benacerraf]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15432 Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest, by Lewis]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
10446 Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
10447 We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
10443 You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
10439 What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
10441 If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
10442 We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
10445 It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
10457 Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
10463 Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
10459 Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach]
10460 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach]
10461 What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach]
10462 Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
10458 People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach]