16 ideas
8833 | Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
1635 | Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine] |
8834 | Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P] |
8838 | If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P] |
8839 | Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P] |
7627 | You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine] |
8871 | We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson] |
8826 | If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine] |
8827 | Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine] |
8899 | Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine] |
8898 | Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine] |
8900 | In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |