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All the ideas for 'What is Logic?st1=Ian Hacking', 'Particulars in Particular Clothing' and 'Realistic Rationalism'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz]
Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A decent modern definition should always imply a semantics [Hacking]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
'Thinning' ('dilution') is the key difference between deduction (which allows it) and induction [Hacking]
Gentzen's Cut Rule (or transitivity of deduction) is 'If A |- B and B |- C, then A |- C' [Hacking]
Only Cut reduces complexity, so logic is constructive without it, and it can be dispensed with [Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
The various logics are abstractions made from terms like 'if...then' in English [Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
First-order logic is the strongest complete compact theory with Löwenheim-Skolem [Hacking]
A limitation of first-order logic is that it cannot handle branching quantifiers [Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order completeness seems to need intensional entities and possible worlds [Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
With a pure notion of truth and consequence, the meanings of connectives are fixed syntactically [Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
Perhaps variables could be dispensed with, by arrows joining places in the scope of quantifiers [Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
If it is a logic, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds for it [Hacking]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz]