Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature?st1=Richard Corry', 'Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism' and 'Conditionals (Stanf)'

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22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
14273 Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
14348 An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry]
14347 A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
14350 If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
14281 A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington]
14284 Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
14270 Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington]
14269 Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14275 Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington]
14274 Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington]
14276 The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington]
14290 Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14271 Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington]
14272 I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
14282 On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
14278 Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
14287 Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
8724 The meaning of 'know' does not change from courtroom to living room [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
8722 No one knows anything, and no one is ever justified or reasonable [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
8723 An evil scientist may give you a momentary life, with totally false memories [Unger]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
14351 Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
14346 Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry]