18 ideas
13941 | Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R] |
13942 | Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R] |
8679 | We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel] |
9942 | Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam] |
18062 | Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel] |
10868 | The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg] |
13517 | If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD] |
10271 | Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel] |
12714 | The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz] |
12743 | A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz] |
13945 | A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R] |
13948 | For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R] |
13950 | People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R] |
13944 | We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R] |
13947 | 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R] |
13943 | We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R] |
13946 | To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R] |
13951 | Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R] |