Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity' and 'Causal and Metaphysical Necessity'

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25 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
The meaning of a number isn't just the numerals leading up to it [Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
A basic grasp of cardinal numbers needs an understanding of equinumerosity [Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
In counting, numerals are used, not mentioned (as objects that have to correlated) [Heck]
Is counting basically mindless, and independent of the cardinality involved? [Heck]
Counting is the assignment of successively larger cardinal numbers to collections [Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
Understanding 'just as many' needn't involve grasping one-one correspondence [Heck]
We can know 'just as many' without the concepts of equinumerosity or numbers [Heck]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Frege's Theorem explains why the numbers satisfy the Peano axioms [Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Children can use numbers, without a concept of them as countable objects [Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Equinumerosity is not the same concept as one-one correspondence [Heck]
We can understand cardinality without the idea of one-one correspondence [Heck]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker]
I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker]
Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker]