18 ideas
| 18369 | There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham] |
| 19318 | A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham] |
| 19319 | If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham] |
| 19320 | If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham] |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 19315 | In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 19317 | An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham] |
| 19322 | Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham] |
| 3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
| 3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
| 3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
| 3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
| 3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
| 3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| 3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |