Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'Universal Prescriptivism' and 'Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
11211 If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11210 Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
11212 The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
23664 Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid]
23669 Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
23666 It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
23665 Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
23668 Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
11214 We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20051 Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8383 Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
23667 Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
23670 Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid]
23671 Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid]