15 ideas
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
| 12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
| 12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
| 12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
| 12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
| 6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
| 6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
| 6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
| 6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
| 6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |