39 ideas
3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
9136 | The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen] |
3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
9131 | Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen] |
9139 | If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen] |
9140 | Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
9119 | No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
9135 | We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen] |
9125 | Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen] |
9137 | Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen] |
9116 | Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen] |
9132 | An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen] |
3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
9128 | It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen] |
9130 | Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen] |
9118 | The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen] |
9124 | We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen] |
3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
9126 | Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen] |
3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
9121 | Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen] |
3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
9134 | The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen] |
9133 | Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |
9129 | I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen] |
9122 | God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen] |