58 ideas
21360 | Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle] |
4767 | Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos] |
10792 | The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
4810 | Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos] |
13212 | Infinity is only potential, never actual [Aristotle] |
13221 | Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle] |
4768 | The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos] |
16100 | True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle] |
16101 | A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle] |
12133 | If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle] |
13213 | All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle] |
12134 | Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle] |
16572 | Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle] |
16573 | Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle] |
13214 | The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle] |
13215 | If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle] |
16717 | Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle] |
4807 | A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos] |
4808 | If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos] |
4811 | Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos] |
4812 | Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos] |
4802 | Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos] |
4804 | The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos] |
4805 | If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos] |
4395 | There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos] |
4806 | An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos] |
4404 | Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos] |
4803 | An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos] |
4769 | It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos] |
4770 | Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos] |
13216 | Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form [Aristotle] |
17994 | The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold [Aristotle] |
13224 | There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time [Aristotle] |
16594 | The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible [Aristotle] |
13223 | Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry [Aristotle] |
13220 | Bodies are endlessly divisible [Aristotle] |
13210 | Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? [Aristotle] |
13211 | If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? [Aristotle] |
4403 | We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos] |
4399 | Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos] |
4400 | Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos] |
4789 | Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos] |
4790 | If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos] |
4402 | Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos] |
4774 | Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos] |
4793 | "All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos] |
4397 | Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos] |
4792 | A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos] |
4801 | The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos] |
4401 | It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos] |
4796 | Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos] |
4799 | Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos] |
4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |
13228 | There is no time without movement [Aristotle] |
16595 | If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? [Aristotle] |
13227 | Being is better than not-being [Aristotle] |
13226 | An Order controls all things [Aristotle] |