35 ideas
| 17729 | Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins] |
| 18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
| 17740 | Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins] |
| 19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
| 18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
| 17730 | Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins] |
| 19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
| 17719 | Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins] |
| 17717 | Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins] |
| 17724 | It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins] |
| 17727 | We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins] |
| 17720 | There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG] |
| 17728 | The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins] |
| 18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
| 17726 | Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins] |
| 17734 | It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins] |
| 19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
| 17723 | Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins] |
| 19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
| 18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
| 19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
| 17739 | The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins] |
| 17718 | Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins] |
| 18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
| 17731 | Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins] |
| 17732 | Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins] |
| 18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
| 18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
| 17725 | 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins] |
| 19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |