31 ideas
10301 | The axiom of choice is controversial, but it could be replaced [Shapiro] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
10588 | First-order logic is Complete, and Compact, with the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems [Shapiro] |
10298 | Some say that second-order logic is mathematics, not logic [Shapiro] |
10299 | If the aim of logic is to codify inferences, second-order logic is useless [Shapiro] |
10300 | Logical consequence can be defined in terms of the logical terminology [Shapiro] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
10290 | Second-order variables also range over properties, sets, relations or functions [Shapiro] |
10590 | Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if natural numbers satisfy wffs, then an infinite domain satisfies them [Shapiro] |
10296 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems fail for second-order languages with standard semantics [Shapiro] |
10297 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem seems to be a defect of first-order logic [Shapiro] |
10292 | Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: if there's an infinite model, there is a countable model [Shapiro] |
10294 | Second-order logic has the expressive power for mathematics, but an unworkable model theory [Shapiro] |
23708 | Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG] |
23709 | Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
10591 | Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro] |
23707 | Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23714 | Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23711 | A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23712 | Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23698 | Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23699 | 'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23700 | A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23701 | A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23702 | A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23703 | Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23704 | We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23710 | Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
23706 | Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |