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All the ideas for 'What is Logic?st1=Ian Hacking', 'Disputed questions about truth' and 'Metaphysics: the logical approach'

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
3358 Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
3312 There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
3352 Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3329 Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? [Benardete,JA]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
13838 A decent modern definition should always imply a semantics [Hacking]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
22104 Truth is the conformity of being to intellect [Aquinas]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
13833 'Thinning' ('dilution') is the key difference between deduction (which allows it) and induction [Hacking]
13834 Gentzen's Cut Rule (or transitivity of deduction) is 'If A |- B and B |- C, then A |- C' [Hacking]
13835 Only Cut reduces complexity, so logic is constructive without it, and it can be dispensed with [Hacking]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
3326 Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics [Benardete,JA]
3327 The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it [Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
3335 The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms [Benardete,JA, by PG]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
13845 The various logics are abstractions made from terms like 'if...then' in English [Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
13840 First-order logic is the strongest complete compact theory with Löwenheim-Skolem [Hacking]
13844 A limitation of first-order logic is that it cannot handle branching quantifiers [Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
13842 Second-order completeness seems to need intensional entities and possible worlds [Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
13837 With a pure notion of truth and consequence, the meanings of connectives are fixed syntactically [Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
13839 Perhaps variables could be dispensed with, by arrows joining places in the scope of quantifiers [Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
13843 If it is a logic, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds for it [Hacking]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
3332 Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic [Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
3330 Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations [Benardete,JA]
3337 Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) [Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
22103 Being is basic to thought, and all other concepts are additions to being [Aquinas]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
3310 If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
12793 Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
3353 If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
3304 Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
3350 Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
3309 If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
3351 One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
3314 Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA]
3323 Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
3306 The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
3349 If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects [Benardete,JA]
3341 Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' [Benardete,JA]
3344 Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic [Benardete,JA]
3345 Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge [Benardete,JA]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
3334 Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions [Benardete,JA]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
3308 In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' [Benardete,JA]