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All the ideas for '', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement' and 'Which Logic is the Right Logic?'

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31 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The axiom of choice now seems acceptable and obvious (if it is meaningful) [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
Logic is either for demonstration, or for characterizing structures [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Elementary logic is complete, but cannot capture mathematics [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order logic isn't provable, but will express set-theory and classic problems [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions can be reduced to 'not' and 'and' [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
The main quantifiers extend 'and' and 'or' to infinite domains [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
There are at least five unorthodox quantifiers that could be used [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Skolem mistakenly inferred that Cantor's conceptions were illusory [Tharp]
The Löwenheim-Skolem property is a limitation (e.g. can't say there are uncountably many reals) [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
Completeness and compactness together give axiomatizability [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
If completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Compactness is important for major theories which have infinitely many axioms [Tharp]
Compactness blocks infinite expansion, and admits non-standard models [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas [Tharp]
Effective enumeration might be proved but not specified, so it won't guarantee knowledge [Tharp]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions [Reid]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face [Reid]