16 ideas
| 6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
| 6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
| 6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
| 20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
| 20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
| 20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
| 20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
| 20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
| 6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
| 20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |