44 ideas
| 21844 | The history of philosophy is an agent of power: how can you think if you haven't read the great names? [Deleuze] |
| 21849 | Thought should be thrown like a stone from a war-machine [Deleuze] |
| 21845 | Philosophy aims to become the official language, supporting orthodoxy and the state [Deleuze] |
| 9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
| 21839 | When I meet objections I just move on; they never contribute anything [Deleuze] |
| 16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
| 21841 | We must create new words, and treat them as normal, and as if designating real things. [Deleuze] |
| 21842 | Don't assess ideas for truth or justice; look for another idea, and establish a relationship with it [Deleuze] |
| 21850 | Dualisms can be undone from within, by tracing connections, and drawing them to a new path [Deleuze] |
| 9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
| 21838 | Before we seek solutions, it is important to invent problems [Deleuze] |
| 16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
| 21847 | Before Being there is politics [Deleuze] |
| 16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
| 9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
| 9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
| 16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
| 16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
| 9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
| 9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
| 16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
| 9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
| 9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
| 20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
| 16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
| 16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
| 16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
| 16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
| 21840 | A meeting of man and animal can be deterritorialization (like a wasp with an orchid) [Deleuze] |
| 16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
| 16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
| 8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
| 16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
| 21843 | People consist of many undetermined lines, some rigid, some supple, some 'lines of flight' [Deleuze] |
| 9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
| 16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
| 9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
| 21848 | Some lines (of flight) are becomings which escape the system [Deleuze] |
| 7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
| 16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
| 16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
| 16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
| 16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |