17 ideas
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 18755 | Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 18761 | Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee] |
| 18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
| 18754 | Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee] |
| 18757 | Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee] |
| 18760 | The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee] |
| 18762 | A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| 18225 | If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard] |
| 18228 | An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard] |
| 18224 | Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard] |
| 18233 | Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard] |
| 18226 | For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard] |