Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'Ontological Relativity' and 'Davidson on himself'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]