21 ideas
13010 | In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
9002 | Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine] |
13681 | Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
13829 | If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
9003 | Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine] |
9004 | If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine] |
9006 | Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine] |
9001 | Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine] |
9005 | Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine] |
10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |