13 ideas
| 8679 | We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel] |
| 9942 | Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam] |
| 18062 | Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel] |
| 10868 | The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg] |
| 13517 | If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD] |
| 10271 | Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel] |
| 14637 | Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael] |
| 14636 | Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael] |
| 14640 | Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael] |
| 14638 | Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael] |
| 14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |
| 9111 | God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good [William of Ockham] |
| 9112 | We could never form a concept of God's wisdom if we couldn't abstract it from creatures [William of Ockham] |