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All the ideas for 'A Conversation: what is it? What is it for?st1=Gilles Deleuze', 'Action' and 'Epistemic Justification'

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
21844 The history of philosophy is an agent of power: how can you think if you haven't read the great names? [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
21849 Thought should be thrown like a stone from a war-machine [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
21845 Philosophy aims to become the official language, supporting orthodoxy and the state [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
21839 When I meet objections I just move on; they never contribute anything [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
21841 We must create new words, and treat them as normal, and as if designating real things. [Deleuze]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
21842 Don't assess ideas for truth or justice; look for another idea, and establish a relationship with it [Deleuze]
21850 Dualisms can be undone from within, by tracing connections, and drawing them to a new path [Deleuze]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
21838 Before we seek solutions, it is important to invent problems [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
21847 Before Being there is politics [Deleuze]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
21840 A meeting of man and animal can be deterritorialization (like a wasp with an orchid) [Deleuze]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
21843 People consist of many undetermined lines, some rigid, some supple, some 'lines of flight' [Deleuze]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
21848 Some lines (of flight) are becomings which escape the system [Deleuze]