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All the ideas for 'Logic (Encyclopedia I)', 'From Supervenience to Superdupervenience' and 'Modality'

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68 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
True philosophy aims at absolute unity, while our understanding sees only separation [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Free thinking has no presuppositions [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
The ideal of reason is the unification of abstract identity (or 'concept') and being [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
We must break up the rigidity that our understanding has imposed [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Let thought follow its own course, and don't interfere [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Categories create objective experience, but are too conditioned by things to actually grasp them [Hegel]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
If truth is just non-contradiction, we must take care that our basic concepts aren't contradictory [Hegel]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Older metaphysics became dogmatic, by assuming opposed assertions must be true and false [Hegel]
Dialectic is seen in popular proverbs like 'pride comes before a fall' [Hegel]
Dialectic is the moving soul of scientific progression, the principle which binds science together [Hegel]
Socratic dialectic is subjective, but Plato made it freely scientific and objective [Hegel]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness [Hegel]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false [Hegel, by Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
In the deeper sense of truth, to be untrue resembles being bad; badness is untrue to a thing's nature [Hegel]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
The deeper sense of truth is a thing matching the idea of what it ought to be [Hegel]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle is the maxim of definite understanding, but just produces contradictions [Hegel]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
The idea that contradiction is essential to rational understanding is a key modern idea [Hegel]
Tenderness for the world solves the antinomies; contradiction is in our reason, not in the essence of the world [Hegel]
Antinomies are not just in four objects, but in all objects, all representations, all objects and all ideas [Hegel]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
'Superdupervenience' is supervenience that has a robustly materialistic explanation [Horgan,T]
'Global' supervenience is facts tracking varying physical facts in every possible world [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Don't just observe supervenience - explain it! [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Physicalism
Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T]
Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / a. Facts
Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]
No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Thought about particulars is done entirely through categories [Hegel]
Even simple propositions about sensations are filled with categories [Hegel]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The one substance is formless without the mediation of dialectical concepts [Hegel]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essence is the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation [Hegel]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Real cognition grasps a thing from within itself, and is not satisfied with mere predicates [Hegel]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia]
In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia]
If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia]
Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
The Cogito is at the very centre of the entire concern of modern philosophy [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
The sensible is distinguished from thought by being about singular things [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Sense perception is secondary and dependent, while thought is independent and primitive [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism made particular knowledge possible, and blocked wild claims [Hegel]
Empiricism contains the important idea that we should see knowledge for ourselves, and be part of it [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricism unknowingly contains and uses a metaphysic, which underlies its categories [Hegel]
The Humean view stops us thinking about perception, and finding universals and necessities in it [Hegel]
Empiricism of the finite denies the supersensible, and can only think with formal abstraction [Hegel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Humean scepticism, unlike ancient Greek scepticism, accepts the truth of experience as basic [Hegel]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Instrumentalism normally says some discourse is useful, but not genuinely true [Horgan,T]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together [Hegel]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The act of thinking is the bringing forth of universals [Hegel]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 2. Categories of Understanding
Hegel's system has a vast number of basic concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel]
We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Old metaphysics tried to grasp eternal truths through causal events, which is impossible [Hegel]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
The older conception of God was emptied of human features, to make it worthy of the Infinite [Hegel]
God is the absolute thing, and also the absolute person [Hegel]
If God is the abstract of Supremely Real Essence, then God is a mere Beyond, and unknowable [Hegel]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
We establish unification of the Ideal by the ontological proof, deriving being from abstraction of thinking [Hegel]