Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Difference and Repetition', 'Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason' and 'Every Thing Must Go'

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71 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
Hamann, Herder and Jacobi were key opponents of the Enlightenment [Gardner]
Kant halted rationalism, and forced empiricists to worry about foundations [Gardner]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Only Kant and Hegel have united nature, morals, politics, aesthetics and religion [Gardner]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross]
Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross]
Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross]
Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross]
Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross]
The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross]
A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross]
The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
Transcendental proofs derive necessities from possibilities (e.g. possibility of experiencing objects) [Gardner]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Modern geoemtry is either 'pure' (and formal), or 'applied' (and a posteriori) [Gardner]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze]
Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May]
Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross]
To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality
We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross]
Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Physicalism
Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross]
A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross]
Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross]
There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross]
In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross]
The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross]
The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross]
That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / f. Presentism
A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 3. Space-Time
Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross]
If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross]