Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Difference and Repetition', 'Meaning and Reference' and 'Intro to 'Modality and Tense''

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze]
Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May]
Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Reality
A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam]
'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam]