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All the ideas for 'Difference and Repetition', 'My Philosophical Development' and 'Mind, Brain and the Quantum'

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48 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it [Lockwood]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell]
Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
There may only be necessary and sufficient conditions (and counterfactuals) because we intervene in the world [Lockwood]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
No one has ever succeeded in producing an acceptable non-trivial analysis of anything [Lockwood]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways? [Lockwood]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell]
Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze]
Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May]
Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
How does a direct realist distinguish a building from Buckingham Palace? [Lockwood]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
Dogs seem to have beliefs, and beliefs require concepts [Lockwood]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism is a theory of meaning as well as of knowledge [Lockwood]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
Commonsense realism must account for the similarity of genuine perceptions and known illusions [Lockwood]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
A 1988 estimate gave the brain 3 x 10-to-the-14 synaptic junctions [Lockwood]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
How come unconscious states also cause behaviour? [Lockwood]
Could there be unconscious beliefs and desires? [Lockwood]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
Fish may operate by blindsight [Lockwood]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Can phenomenal qualities exist unsensed? [Lockwood]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If mental events occur in time, then relativity says they are in space [Lockwood]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Only logical positivists ever believed behaviourism [Lockwood]
Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges [Lockwood]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell]
Perhaps logical positivism showed that there is no dividing line between science and metaphysics [Lockwood]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / i. Time and change
We have the confused idea that time is a process of change [Lockwood]