Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Difference and Repetition', 'Why there isn't a ready-made world' and 'Guide to Ground'

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31 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze]
Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May]
Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K]
If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K]
An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K]
'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K]
We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K]
If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K]
Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Anti-realism
It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / a. Facts
Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K]
Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K]
We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]