Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Difference and Repetition', 'The Philosophy of Mathematics' and 'Brainchildren'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
ZF set theory has variables which range over sets, 'equals' and 'member', and extensionality [Dummett]
The main alternative to ZF is one which includes looser classes as well as sets [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Intuitionists reject excluded middle, not for a third value, but for possibility of proof [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
First-order logic concerns objects; second-order adds properties, kinds, relations and functions [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths and inference are characterized either syntactically or semantically [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Ordinals seem more basic than cardinals, since we count objects in sequence [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure [Dummett]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze]
Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May]
Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett]