Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Difference and Repetition', 'Iteration Again' and 'The Principles of Human Knowledge'

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze]
Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May]
Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Anti-realism
Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley]
No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley]
The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley]
When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley]
Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley]
Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley]
I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / j. Time as subjective
I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley]