### All the ideas for 'Difference and Repetition', 'Iteration Again' and 'Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed)'

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29 ideas

###### 1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
 21901 'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May]
###### 2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
 17621 What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett]
###### 4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / c. Basic theorems of ST
 10537 The ordered pairs can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett]
###### 4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
 10542 To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett]
###### 4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
 13547 Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter]
###### 6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
 10554 Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett]
###### 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
 10552 Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett]
###### 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
 21902 'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze]
 21908 Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
###### 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
 21903 Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May]
 21904 Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
###### 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
 10540 We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett]
 10515 Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale]
 10544 The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett]
 10546 We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett]
###### 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
 10548 The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett]
 10281 The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett]
###### 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
 10532 We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett]
###### 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
 10534 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett]
###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
 10541 Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett]
###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
 10545 Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett]
###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
 10555 If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett]
###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
 10543 Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett]
###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
 10320 If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale]
 10547 Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett]
###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
 10531 There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett]
###### 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
 19168 Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson]
###### 18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
 10549 Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett]
###### 19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
 10516 A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale]