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All the ideas for 'Posthumous notes', 'LOT 2' and 'The Language of Thought'

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44 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor]
Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Transcendental philosophy is the subject becoming the originator of unified reality [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Mental states have causal powers [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor]
Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin]
Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor]
We think in file names [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence]
We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor]
Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor]
One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor]
Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor]
We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor]
Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor]