Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Posthumous notes', 'The Universe as We Find It' and 'The Structure of Empirical Knowledge'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


52 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
The best philosophers I know are the best people I know [Heil]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions [Heil]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics [Heil]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically [Heil]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers [Heil]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted [Heil]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true [Heil]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers [Heil]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers [Heil]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction [Heil]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory [Heil]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals [Heil]
In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers? [Heil]
Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities [Heil]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances [Heil]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts [Heil]
A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts [Heil]
Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line [Heil]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Transcendental philosophy is the subject becoming the originator of unified reality [Kant]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth [Bonjour]
There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems [Bonjour]
Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
The objection that a negated system is equally coherent assume that coherence is consistency [Bonjour]
A well written novel cannot possibly match a real belief system for coherence [Bonjour]
A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility [Bonjour]
The best explanation of coherent observations is they are caused by and correspond to reality [Bonjour]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
Anomalies challenge the claim that the basic explanations are actually basic [Bonjour]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent [Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation [Heil]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil]
Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
The subject-predicate form reflects reality [Heil]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy [Heil]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause [Heil]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations [Heil]
27. Natural Reality / D. Cosmology / 9. Fine-Tuned Universe
Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature? [Heil]