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All the ideas for 'works', 'fragments/reports' and 'Metaphysics'

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364 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom [Aristotle]
There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are [Aristotle, by Politis]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles [Aristotle]
Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking [Aristotle]
Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance [Aristotle]
Six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, theology [Cleanthes, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know') [Aristotle, by Annas]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time [Aristotle]
We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man [Aristotle]
Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted [Aristotle, by Politis]
A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time) [Aristotle]
For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 5. Opposites
If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites? [Aristotle]
Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter? [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
The material element may be essential to a definition [Aristotle]
The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity [Aristotle]
If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity? [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
A definition must be of something primary [Aristotle]
Only substance [ousias] admits of definition [Aristotle]
Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not [Aristotle]
Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Aristotle, by Wedin]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson]
'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner [Aristotle]
Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white [Aristotle]
A definition is of the universal and of the kind [Aristotle]
Definition by division is into genus and differentiae [Aristotle]
If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae [Aristotle]
If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too [Aristotle]
Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals [Aristotle, by Witt]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition [Aristotle, by Witt]
A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle]
Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle]
Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle]
Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Aristotle, by Davidson]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Axioms are the underlying principles of everything, and who but the philosopher can assess their truth? [Aristotle]
The axioms of mathematics are part of philosophy [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Aristotle, by Boulter]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle? [Aristotle, by Politis]
We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty [Aristotle]
Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things [Aristotle]
Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Perhaps numbers are substances? [Aristotle]
Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
The one in number just is the particular [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
The unit is stipulated to be indivisible [Aristotle]
Units came about when the unequals were equalised [Aristotle]
If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves [Aristotle]
When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers? [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one [Aristotle]
Number is plurality measured by unity [Aristotle]
The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Aristotle removes ontology from mathematics, and replaces the true with the beautiful [Aristotle, by Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true [Aristotle, by Aquinas]
There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being [Aristotle]
Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy [Aristotle]
Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things [Aristotle, by Politis]
The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer [Aristotle, by Politis]
Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication [Aristotle, by Politis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity? [Aristotle]
Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists' [Aristotle]
The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent [Aristotle]
Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality [Aristotle]
Other types of being all depend on the being of substance [Aristotle]
There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions [Aristotle, by Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
An actuality is usually thought to be a process [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa [Aristotle]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Aristotle, by Macdonald,C]
Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Aristotle, by Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle? [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing [Aristotle]
Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality') [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process [Aristotle]
The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Aristotle, by Politis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it [Aristotle]
Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things [Aristotle]
Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared [Aristotle]
Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Aristotle, by Witt]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle]
If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle]
If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle]
How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities [Aristotle]
The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement [Aristotle]
There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement [Aristotle]
All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any [Aristotle]
Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things? [Aristotle]
Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status [Aristotle, by Moreland]
If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled [Aristotle]
What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities? [Aristotle]
Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation [Aristotle]
Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations [Aristotle]
Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle]
How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist? [Aristotle]
Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process [Aristotle]
The formal cause may be what unifies a substance [Aristotle]
A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible [Aristotle]
Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought [Aristotle]
Things are unified by contact, mixture and position [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance [Aristotle]
'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge [Aristotle, by Witt]
It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance [Aristotle]
The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear [Aristotle]
Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances [Aristotle, by Pasnau]
Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence [Aristotle]
Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing [Aristotle]
A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying [Aristotle]
It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] [Aristotle]
Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness [Aristotle]
The substance is the form dwelling in the object [Aristotle]
Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Aristotle, by Witt]
A thing's substance is its primary cause of being [Aristotle]
In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Aristotle, by Politis]
Substance is distinct being because of its unity [Aristotle, by Witt]
None of the universals can be a substance [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality [Aristotle]
The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney' [Aristotle]
Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Aristotle, by Wedin]
In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt]
Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Aristotle, by Politis]
Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Aristotle, by Kung]
Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form [Aristotle]
Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form [Aristotle]
In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K]
Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt]
Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Is there a house over and above its bricks? [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
Something must pre-exist any new production [Aristotle]
It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter' [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality [Aristotle]
A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
If you extract all features of the object, what is left over? [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it [Aristotle]
If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element? [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants [Aristotle]
Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence [Aristotle, by Aquinas]
Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge [Aristotle, by Copi]
Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
Are essences actually universals? [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular [Aristotle]
Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate [Aristotle]
Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt]
Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Aristotle, by Kung]
Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis]
To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis]
If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature [Aristotle]
An essence causes both its own unity and its kind [Aristotle]
Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle]
Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle]
'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt]
In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force [Aristotle]
The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal [Aristotle, by Witt]
Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal [Aristotle, by Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
How a thing is generated does not explain its essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him [Aristotle, by Witt]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object [Aristotle]
You are one with yourself in form and matter [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction [Aristotle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle]
Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
We recognise potentiality from actuality [Aristotle]
Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances [Aristotle]
A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing [Aristotle]
Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them [Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle]
Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals [Aristotle]
Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind [Aristotle]
It takes skill to know causes, not experience [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle]
If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle]
Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type [Aristotle]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung]
Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences [Aristotle]
We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location [Aristotle]
We know a thing when we grasp its essence [Aristotle]
The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance [Aristotle]
Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind [Aristotle, by Kung]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things [Aristotle]
Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement [Aristotle]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated? [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Bodies interact with other bodies, and cuts cause pain, and shame causes blushing, so the soul is a body [Cleanthes, by Nemesius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The soul suffers when the body hurts, creates redness from shame, and pallor from fear [Cleanthes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Many memories make up a single experience [Aristotle]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things [Aristotle]
Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness [Aristotle]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
Beauty involves the Forms of order, symmetry and limit, which can be handled mathematically [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
The good is found in actions, but beauty can exist without movement [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
A thing's active function is its end [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Excellence is a sort of completion [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Is excellence separate from things, or part of them, or both? [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Wise men aren't instructed; they instruct [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Why are some things destructible and others not? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Everything is arranged around a single purpose [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites [Aristotle]
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects) [Aristotle]
Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category [Aristotle]
Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance [Aristotle, by Kung]
Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter [Aristotle, by Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity [Aristotle]
Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties [Simons on Aristotle]
Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable [Aristotle, by Alexander,P]
The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes [Aristotle]
Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover [Aristotle]
The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good [Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude [Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe [Aristotle, by Armstrong,K]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate [Aristotle]
The ascending scale of living creatures requires a perfect being [Cleanthes, by Tieleman]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus]
There are as many eternal unmovable substances as there are movements of the stars [Aristotle]