Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Matter and Memory', 'Conjectures and Refutations' and 'Propositions'

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16 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper]