15 ideas
16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
21846 | Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |
9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true be observation [Russell] |
21854 | Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |