Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed]', 'Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo' and 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism'

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71 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language [Ellis]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [Ellis, by PG]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way [Ellis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
One thing can look like something else, without being the something else [Ellis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible [Ellis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Necessary truths from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world [Ellis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things [Ellis]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori [Ellis]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility [Ellis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction [Ellis]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass [Ellis]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour [Ellis]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas]
Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas]
However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas]
The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas]
Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications [Ellis, by PG]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas]
We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas]
The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency [Ellis]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions [Ellis]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical [Ellis]
The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas]
Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents [Ellis]
Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances [Ellis]
A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside [Ellis]
The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds [Ellis]
Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances [Ellis]
We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws [Ellis]
The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology [Ellis]