Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed]', 'What is a Law of Nature?st2=David M. Armstrong' and 'Dialectic of Enlightenment'

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50 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 5. Critical Theory
Adorno and Horkheimer subjected the Enlightenment to 'critical theory' analysis [Adorno/Horkheimer, by Finlayson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / b. Types of fact
Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong]
If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong]
Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong]
Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong]
Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Necessary truths from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong]
Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
De Sade said it was impossible to rationally argue against murder [Adorno/Horkheimer]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong]
A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis]
A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong]
Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong]
The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong]