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Ideas for 'Logic (Encyclopedia I)', 'Second Commentary on 'Isagoge'' and 'Philosophy of Mind'

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15 ideas

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil]
Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil]
Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil]