Single Idea 10376

[catalogued under 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation]

Full Idea

If Pam threw the brick that broke the window, then Bob (who refrained) might be a more reliable vandal, so that Pam's throw might have made the shattering less likely, so probability-raising is not necessary for causation.

Gist of Idea

The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause

Source

Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.17


A Reaction

That objection looks pretty conclusive to me. I take the probabilistic view to be a non-starter.