Single Idea 10449

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential]

Full Idea

For Russell, a logically proper name introduces its referent into the proposition, whereas a description introduces a certain quantificational structure, not its denotation.

Gist of Idea

Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications

Source

report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Kent Bach - What Does It Take to Refer? 22.2 L0

Book Reference

'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Lepore,E/Smith,B [OUP 2008], p.535


A Reaction

I have very strong resistance to the idea that the actual referent could ever become part of a proposition. I am not, and never have been, part of a proposition! Russell depended on narrow 'acquaintance', which meant that few things qualified.