Single Idea 10938

[catalogued under 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism]

Full Idea

It would be natural to label one extreme view 'maximal essentialism' - that all of an object's properties are essential - and the other extreme 'minimal' - that only trivial properties such as self-identity of being either F or not-F are essential.

Gist of Idea

The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones

Source

Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008])

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.7


A Reaction

Personally I don't accept the trivial ones as being in any way describable as 'properties'. The maximal view destroys any useful notion of essence. Leibniz is a minority holder of the maximal view. I would defend a middle way.